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Terrorists, rioters and crocodiles: the political symbolism of an Olympic monster 
 
Alec Charles 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In August 2005, just a month after the announcement that London had succeeded in its bid to 
host the 2012 Olympic Games, the UK national press witnessed a brief rash of stories alleging 
the presence of a crocodile or similar water monster lurking beneath the surface of the River 
Lea – the river that runs from the town of Luton in Bedfordshire down to join the Thames 
adjacent to the Olympic site. This story re-emerged in November 2011 when a campaigner 
against the environmental impact of the Olympics on the river area claimed to have seen further 
evidence of crocodilian activity. This paper will explore the reasons for the proliferation of this 
story, in terms both of its function as a metonymic news-hook (it opened up directly related 
concerns as to the impact, organization and security of the Games) and of its metaphorical 
significance (its incarnation of a superstructure’s fears of an emerging threat of a monstrous 
underclass – one which might at once comprise terrorists, rioters and anti-establishment 
campaigners). It will conclude by suggesting that this monstrous myth might hold within it the 
possibility of the convergence of populist news media and popular democracy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL ANIMALS 
You do not have to be Alastair Campbell or Brian Leveson to appreciate the intimate bond 
between politics and the media in the UK. Yet Dahlberg and Phelan (2011: 6) have pertinently 
noted “critical political theorists’ relative neglect” of issues arising from media analysis. 
Considering the extent and the quality of arguments and analyses advanced by those who 
straddle the disciplines of political science and media studies – and considering the extent and 
impact of the relationships between media and politics – this neglect is somewhat disappointing. 
In his seminal account of The Political Impact of Mass Media, Colin Seymour-Ure (1974: 62) 
observes that communication processes “have a great effect upon the nature of society, 
including its political system” and goes on to argue that “media are so deeply embedded in the 
system that without them political activity in its contemporary forms could scarcely carry on 
at all.” That is not to subscribe to a behaviourist or technologically determinist view of what 
Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 11) call the “myth of the media’s irresistible power of persuasion” 
– but is to allow that media forms reflect (and may therefore be deployed to confront and to 
counter) but also simultaneously reinforce structures of power – and therefore to admit a greater 
complexity of influence in which hegemonic messages may be subverted by radical or 
deconstructive modes of interpretation. For, as Street (2011: 287) notes, “media power operates 
through the way it [...] constructs particular forms of reality” and this process underpins “the 
interests which animate people’s demands on, and expectations for, the political system.” 
 
It is perhaps a truism to observe that the popular mass media mediate between power and the 
popular masses. The notion, however, that the media fulfil a “democratic function” by 
“representing people to authority” is, for Curran (2002: 227) at least, “fundamentally flawed”. 
If they do not therefore perform that function by which they might be said to speak truth to 
power, then by speaking from power to the people, they may at least speak some truth of power 
– that is, they may intimate what they mediate, the relations between power and the people. 
While this is not in itself democratic (democracy conversely speaks from the people to power) 
it plays an essential role for the maintenance of democracy insofar as it may cast light upon 
power structures whose disparities may be addressed by democratic dynamics. In order for 
democracy to be possible, society must be aware of how undemocratic it is. The texts which 
primarily reflect the failings of democracy are not therefore those which are intentionally 
democratic, nor indeed even overtly political. Terry Eagleton (1976: 29) pointed out  that “all 
great art is socially progressive” – even that which is “overtly reactionary” – in that it realizes 
the historical forces of its period, penetrating “through the accidental phenomena of life to 
disclose the essences or essentials of a condition.”  Art, then, as George Orwell (1957) 
suggested, does not have to confront the hegemony but can serve a key societal function in 
merely reflecting the soul of the societal Leviathan from inside its belly. What is true of great 
art may also be true of mass culture – indeed it would seem reasonable to suppose that the 
popularity of mass media forms may be related to the extent to which they capture the 
ideological zeitgeist. 
 
Some may be uncomfortable with the discovery of symbolic discourses which elaborate 
macrocosmic social, economic and political relations in such populist forms as the ‘soft’ news 
stories this paper explores. McQuail (1987: 206) has, however,  observed that the qualities of 
hard and soft news are often hard to distinguish – and perhaps this is because the latter tends 
symbolically to mirror the structures and concerns of the former. Bird and Dardenne (1988: 69) 
have warned that any artificial dichotomy between our perceptions of so-called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
news “blinds us to the way that narratives devices are used” in all modes of news writing to 
perpetuate symbolic power structures. Bird and Dardenne (1988: 69) propose that “the facts, 
names, and details change almost daily, but the framework into which they fit – the symbolic 
system – is more enduring.” Moreover, they go on to argue that “the totality of news as an 
enduring symbolic system ‘teaches’ audiences more than its component parts” (Bird and 
Dardenne 1988: 69). In other words, even the softest and most insignificant of news stories 
may contribute significantly (if incrementally) to a broad and largely invisible ideological 
structure. This paper will explore how such structures may be perpetuated and interrogated by 
some of the softest of soft news stories – through a particularly mythical case of animal 
reportage. 
 
The attitudes of human civilization towards nature have much to say about the history of that 
civilization insofar as – as the historian Keith Thomas (1984: 16) has argued – “it is impossible 
to disentangle what the people of the past thought about plants and animals from what they 
thought about themselves.” Keith Thomas’s seminal study of Man and the Natural World 
focused on England in the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century; but other, more recent 
British studies have adopted a more contemporary and political approach to the analysis of 
mass media representations of nature.  
 
Molloy (2011: 1) points out that “animal narratives are economically significant for popular 
media industries” and that “animal stories account for a substantial proportion of soft news” – 
functioning as an “antidote to hard news, which typically focuses on crime, politics,  science, 
economics and war” (Molloy 2011: 2). We may nevertheless suppose that these ‘soft’ animal 
stories can in fact reflect the concerns of so-called harder news, and that this quality may to a 
significant extent account for their popularity and ubiquity. Cassidy and Mills (2012: 499, 506) 
have, for example, witnessed in the news reporting of an urban fox attack “global concerns 
over humanity and nature” which might productively inform notions of “environmental 
citizenship”. This author has meanwhile written of how news representations of the rivalry 
between red and grey squirrels may be seen as symbolizing ethnic divisions within the UK 
(Charles 2011), and of how the widespread reporting of the death of Britain’s largest wild 
animal, an Exmoor deer, in late 2010 (allegedly at the hands of foreign bankers) may have 
echoed tensions and anxieties resulting from the 2007 credit crunch and subsequent global 
recession (Charles 2012).  
 
This symbolic function seems particularly relevant in terms of the construction of such popular 
images of animal monstrosity as that which this paper explores. These images appear to 
manifest prevalent (albeit repressed) socio-political anxieties. Indeed, as Molloy (2011: 165) 
argues, “culture will always need fictional monsters onto which social anxieties can be 
projected.” Thus Knight (2000: 3) has supposed that “the symbolic dimension of the wildlife 
threat” may illuminate “ways in which conflicts with wildlife overlap with conflict among 
people.” Knight (2000: 17) goes on to argue that images of “wildlife dangers” reveal anxieties 
as to “human immorality” and thereby observes that such “predatory animal behaviour disturbs 
not just because it is an outside threat, but also because it is potentially internal to the realm of 
human actions.” 
 
Thus these apparently unpolitical accounts come to appear increasingly politically meaningful 
and influential. Everyday discourse is at its most ideologically persuasive when it appears at 
its least overtly political. Wodak (1989: 141) writes that “forms of persuasive language [...] fix 
empty formulae, catchwords and stereotypes thereby excluding any kind of reflection” and that, 
as a result, “in the subconscious certain categories [...] become established, often without the 
citizen knowing what it is ‘really all about’, what it ‘really means’.” This is the origin of much 
entrenched ideology, and specifically of that mode of ideology which is especially problematic 
precisely because it is unconscious or un-thought-out. It therefore seems essential that we 
develop strategies whereby we reflect upon, unpick or deconstruct these crucially influential 
and impactful but often overlooked aspects of our discursive experience and practices. If, as 
Wodak et al. (2009: 8) argue, “discursive practices may influence the formation of social 
groups and may serve to establish or conceal relations of power between [...] social groups and 
classes, between [...] national, ethnic [...] political, cultural and sub-cultural majorities and 
minorities,” it may prove useful to develop strategic approaches whereby we might reveal those 
power relations established and reinforced by discourse and which that discourse 
simultaneously conceals. It is precisely in the most ostensibly trivial (and therefore commonly 
uninterrogated) aspects of popular discourse that such an approach might prove the most 
fruitful and necessary. 
 
Such discourse is core to the evolution of socio-political identities. Wodak et al. (2009:.22) 
specifically argue that nationhood is “constructed and conveyed in discourse, predominantly 
in narratives of national culture.” The impact of such symbolic-discursive systems proves semi-
nal to the political construction of societal systems. As Wodak (1996: 12) asserts, “institutional 
reality is produced and reproduced through discourse.” This discourse of nationhood is at its 
most influential in its most pervasive and prevalent forms: in the national media, and perhaps 
most significantly in the popular press. Thus Anderson (1991: 35-36) witnesses within the 
processes of the production and consumption of what he describes as the “newspaper-as-fiction” 
the broader development of a mythical discourse of nationhood. Through the homogenising 
effects of its mass media manifestations, discourse has been, for Anderson (1991: 46), reified 
into the fact of nationhood: “the convergence of capitalism and print technology [...] created 
the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which [...] set the stage for the modern 
nation.” Conboy (2006: 46) similarly explores how the rhetoric of the popular press is 
“deployed to provide a relatively consistent view of the national community” – a community 
which gains “cohesion through the cross-media concentration on its symbols and themes.” 
Conboy (2006: 68) argues that the relationship between this populist discourse and the 
historical narratives of nationhood represents “an essential element in enabling the imaginary 
community of the nation to retain its cultural and political authority.” This process makes the 
political appear natural and unpolitical; it reimagines any given political structure as the logical 
(and therefore incontrovertible) order of things. Allan (2004: 77) has thus suggested that “news 
discourses help to naturalize a cultural politics of legitimacy so as to lend justification to 
modern society’s distribution of power and influence.” He points out that news discourse serves 
to “depoliticize the dominant meanings, values and beliefs associated with these inequalities 
and in doing so contribute to their perpetuation” (Allan 2004: 77). This paper examines how 
one apparently unpolitical manifestation of such discourse naturalizes and thereby reinforces 
this political authority (the authority of the state as a Hobbesian Leviathan) – but also how it 
nevertheless may be interpreted as simultaneously subverting that authority by exposing the 
Leviathan within. 
 
We might therefore suppose that, in that the political structuration of nationhood is founded 
upon public discourse, and in that such discourse is witnessed functioning most influentially 
through its mass media manifestations, the analysis of such manifestations should prove 
valuable in any attempt to understand the power relations which underpin popular news 
discourse and which therefore underpin political society – however unpolitical that discourse 
may at first appear to be. The analysis of everyday symbolism in popular usage may reveal not 
only how that discourse reinforces and conceals power structures but also how the 
contradictions within such discourse may expose failures within the logic of such structures, in 
order,  as Wodak (1989, xiv) puts it, “to uncover and de-mystify certain social processes [...] 
to make mechanisms of manipulation, discrimination, demagogy and propaganda explicit and 
transparent [...] to [...] understand how and why reality is structured in a certain way.” As 
Toolan (1988: 236) emphasizes, it may in this way prove useful to “unpick” such superficially 
unpolitical, populist discourse “so as to see what a particular narrative version of events is 
tacitly committed to.”  
 
2. CONTEXT: MIRED IN MYTH 
The waters of the River Lea trickle down from the Chilterns towards the point at which it meets 
the Thames in east London, alongside the site of the 2012 Olympic Games. This river’s placid 
waters conceal hidden depths, tales of mystery and monstrosity – and specifically, in both 2005 
and 2011, stories of some kind of crocodile inhabiting its murky course. 
 
Crocodiles and alligators have traditionally made for popular news stories. These mysterious, 
exotic, man-eating, pre-historic monsters have captivated the popular imagination since well 
before the likes of Mandeville, Pliny and Herodotus dared breathe their name; and it seems 
likely they will continue to do so. The advances of civilization have not dulled the human 
fascination with such creatures; on the contrary, such fascination seems to grow ever greater 
the more incongruous and immoveable these ancient animals seem. They tantalize civilization 
with their remorseless atavism. 
 
On 1 May 2000 the BBC had, for example, reported that “Australia’s preparations for the 
Sydney Olympics” were interrupted when the most popular event at Northern Australia’s 
Relaxation Games, “synchronised beer drinking, was disrupted when a four-metre crocodile 
was discovered in the town’s lake.” On 22 March 2002 the BBC reported a further crocodilian 
connection with the Olympics: “The organisers of the 2004 [Athens] Olympics are trying to 
evict a nine-foot crocodile so they can start building the sailing venue.” This paper will examine 
how the spectre of a crocodilian also came to haunt the preparations for another staging of the 
Olympic Games, in London 2012. 
 
The purpose of this paper is not to consider whether the River Lea has ever been inhabited by 
a crocodile. As Sarah Shippey, Senior Water Administrator at the Canal and River Trust 
London, has commented, “a crocodile was never spotted by anyone, even those reporting it.” 
Ms Shippey has added that “this was covered by the press as this was an interesting story but 
there were no facts to suggest this was possible in any of our waterways.” This paper therefore 
asks why, if it was not based convincingly in verifiable fact, this story became so popular, and 
thereby explores how it tangentially or symbolically articulated with the zeitgeist of early 
twenty-first century Britain, with the concerns, that is, of its reporters, editors and readers. 
 
The story is clearly not massively significant in itself: it does not warn of an infestation of killer 
reptiles resulting from global warning or poor zoo-keeping, a danger to life, limb and shipping. 
Even Patrick Sawer, the journalist who first broke the story in a major newspaper (London’s 
Evening Standard), has confessed that he does not “remember writing the story.” He has added 
that “that’s not surprising given that on the Standard we would push out quite a few stories 
each day, often at an insanely early time of day.” It was, suffice to say, little more than a run-
of-the-mill space-filler; but it is often through such insignificant spaces that symbolic and 
subliminal ideological messages may propagate and proliferate.  
 
Neil Arnold, who in July 2012 covered the story for the Fortean Times, has commented that 
he is “not sure why anyone thinks there is a crocodile in the River Lea.” He has added that “the 
story probably received so much press because as usual the facts were left out. Newspapers use 
headlines to catch the eye whether they are true or not. A headline mentioning a crocodile is 
eye-catching, if complete rubbish. I don’t think the story is really that dramatic. The same could 
be said for the Loch Ness Monster which is most likely a sturgeon – but calling it the Loch 
Ness Sturgeon will certainly not sell T-shirts to tourists!.” 
 
In their study of The Meaning of the Loch Ness Monster, Grimshaw and Lester (1976: 13) note 
that newspapers produce “newsworthy stories” by “working up” the news towards a 
“marketable end product” – in this case, specifically by developing an “aura of mystery”. 
Similar strategies are clearly afoot in the news representations of the River Lea monster – 
indeed 23 overt references to “mystery” and to the “mysterious” are made in the 23 stories 
which in total reported manifestations of the creature in 2005 and 2011. But this sense of 
mystery is not enough in itself. (If it were, Nessie and the Yeti would dominate the tabloid front 
pages every day.) Grimshaw and Lester go on to note that media accounts of the Loch Ness 
Monster have also historically been framed within issues of contemporary concern, from 
residual unease in relation to the formerly rebellious culture of Highland Scotland to anxieties 
as to the increasing prevalence of scientific rationalism. This study similarly observes the ways 
in which the fantasy of the monster of the River Lea reflects real contemporary concerns.  
 
3. 1995-2006: NEWSPAPER ALLEGATIONS 
It was on 28 July 2005 that this legend first emerged in the British press. The story was broken 
by the Leyton & Leytonstone Guardian and propagated over the following weeks across that 
publication’s stablemates in the East London & West Essex Guardian series of local 
newspapers. This first report suggested that the sighting by members of the Lea Rivers Trust 
in the region of Hackney Marshes of a Canada goose “suddenly dragged backwards through 
the water” only to “vanish beneath the surface without a trace” might mean that there was a 
crocodile on the loose in the river. This unusual sight had first been reported by an ecologist 
called Annie Chipchase. It may be noted that five months earlier (on 17 February 2005) Ms 
Chipchase had told the BBC of her objections to the proposal to site the Olympics in that part 
of London. It may also be noted that, of the two named witnesses to the River Lea’s goose-
snatching phenomena (one in 2005, one in 2011), both were ardent campaigners against the 
Olympic development. 
 
Ms Chipchase has since commented: “What I saw was a goose struggling in the water, then 
disappearing never to re-emerge. Other people saw it and there were various theories but I 
forgot about it. It hit the news because one of the other people mentioned it when working with 
volunteers, one of whom has an eye for stories and press contacts. The reporter had a field day. 
I also believe it was the press silly season.” (We may note that when the story returned in 2011 
it came outside the so-called ‘silly season’ of summer news reporting; by 2011 the Olympic 
connection had made the story newsworthy on a normal news day.) 
 
By 4 August 2005 London’s Evening Standard newspaper had picked up the story. It seems 
significant that this was just a month after London – and specifically this area of east London 
– had won its bid to host the Olympics (London’s win had been announced on 6 July) and the 
Standard was clearly aware of this news-hook: “In seven years,” the Standard began, “it will 
provide the landscaped parkland backdrop to London’s Olympic village. That is if the giant 
crocodile said to be lurking in its waters does not eat the builders.” The Standard added to the 
mix previously unreported accounts of “the mysterious disappearance of dogs and cygnets from 
near the river.” The following day the Daily Express and the Daily Star ran the story (complete 
with the Olympic angle and the references to the missing dogs and cygnets) – as did the BBC, 
which held back on talk of vanished dogs (but mentioned missing cygnets and “vanishing 
wildlife”) and avoided the Star’s allusion to a “man-eating beast”. The Sun that same day went 
so far as to announce that a crocodile had actually been “spotted” in the river (rather than 
merely that a goose had been seen to disappear under its surface). When also that day the story 
returned to the Leyton & Leytonstone Guardian it came complete with the missing dogs and 
swans which it had previously lacked. This creature of pre-history was thus portrayed as a 
direct threat to key symbols of civilization: social domesticity (the dog) and constitutional 
establishment (the swan). 
 
While the Mail’s Metro spin-off was reporting that a “killer croc” was “thought to be behind 
the killings of a number of birds and even dogs”, the BBC, on 11 August, suggested that the 
croc in question might in fact be a “giant turtle”. Nevertheless, the following day, an intrepid 
reporter for the East London & West Essex Guardian papers recounted a brave (but not 
particularly successful) boat trip up river to hunt for the alleged alligator; by this time the havoc 
wreaked by the crocodilian included “the mysterious disappearance of large birds including a 
Canada goose and five cygnets.” On 18 and 19 August the same newspaper group added a 
couple more stories on the subject, with little substantial new material other than suggestions 
that the culprit might not be a crocodile after all but (as the BBC had suggested) a giant two-
metre-long, 200-pound “alligator snapping turtle”. 
 
The following day the story reappeared in The Sun, along with tales of other giant and exotic 
creatures on the loose in the UK. Ten days later the story finally arrived at The Independent in 
a feature ridiculing the silliest stories of the silly season: “Had anyone seen the reptile? No. 
Was there really a giant crocodile lurking in the river? Certainly not.” 
 
And so (apart from a curious allusion to the creature from a London tourism spokesperson in 
an Evening Standard story of June 2006 claiming a crocodile had been “spotted” in the Lea the 
previous year) it seemed that the great mutant crocoturtle of the River Lea had submerged for 
good. Until, that is, five years later when, like all good monsters, it came back. 
 
4. 2011-2012: SEE YOU LATER, ALLIGATOR 
On 6 November 2011 Ted Jeory resurrected the story in the Express with reports of another 
Canada goose disappearing: “it went down vertically,” said the witness. (Sceptics might argue 
that such behaviour is not unknown for several species of geese.) Jeory’s story however adds 
an important context: it notes that the witness in question (a boatman called Mike Wells) 
happened to be “a campaigner against the 2012 Olympics’ impact on East London.”  
 
Four days later the Docklands and East London Advertiser ran with the story: this time the 
witness added that “there is a big predator in the water and the swan numbers are going down.” 
(As in the previous incarnation of this narrative, a goose takes a dive and then unsubstantiated 
rumours of missing swans abound.) On 13 December the BBC ran with the story of the River 
Lea’s “goose-killer” or “goose-eating beast”. The same day The Sun reported on the river’s 
“killer water beast” or “mysterious killer beast” – this time presenting the witness’s claim of a 
decline in the swan population as objective fact: “The number of swans on the river and 
waterways near the £9 billion park in East London is also dropping.” Ted Jeory, the journalist 
who broke the story in the Express, has noted that “it suddenly appeared in The Sun a month 
later using all my quotes without any attribution or having talked to Mike the boater himself.” 
What is also notable is that these reconstitutions of Jeory’s story no longer included his original 
context or implicit caveat: the fact that the witness had been campaigning against the impact of 
the Olympics upon the area. This decontextualization was accompanied in The Sun by what 
John Fiske (1987: 43), after Roland Barthes, would term an act of ‘exnomination’ – a removal 
of the name of the source of information, a shift from a providence-conscious subjective 
perspective towards the appearance of objective truth. When the source of a rumour is erased – 
[a local resident said that] swan numbers are declining – the rumour becomes equivalent to fact. 
 
The next day (14 December), The Daily Telegraph’s Olympics editor presented a rather more 
sober perspective on the story: “Officials believe that a report of a 16lb Canada goose being 
attacked in the river by an alligator [...] may instead be the work of a large pike.” The Guardian, 
however, adopted the rhetoric of the BBC and The Sun, relating tales of “a mystery ‘goose-
eating’ beast”, “a mystery goose-eating creature” or a “mystery ‘goose-killer’”. The Mail wrote 
of a “killer beast” and picked up on The Sun’s announcement of the decline in the local swan 
population almost verbatim: “The number of swans on the river and waterways near the newly-
built £9bn Olympic Park is also dropping.” The possibility that the reduction of wildfowl 
numbers in the area might have resulted from the environmental disruption caused by that 
massive construction project appears not to have occurred to these reporters. 
 
The following day The Guardian’s Marina Hyde made mocking reference to The Sun’s 
reporting of the story (apparently unaware that her own paper had also reported it in similarly 
sensationalist terms), and the day after that (16 December) the Telegraph’s Olympics editor 
laid the story to rest with the news that there had been “no sightings in the past three days of 
any crocodiles” and suggesting that the creature might have moved on from the Lea to Loch 
Ness. 
 
And so the story submerged again, save for a sole piece in The Independent on 27 July 2012 – 
the day of the Olympics’ opening ceremony – which observed in passing that the area of the 
Olympic Park had once witnessed “a 16lb Canadian goose [...] pulled under the water” adding 
that “experts blamed a crocodile.” It remains unclear at what point the goose had been weighed. 
 
5. METONYMICITY: THE CROCODILE OLYMPIAD 
Why had this narrative made it so big in the first place? The Express reporter Ted Jeory suspects 
that the story took off because it was “a classic British weird and wonderful story: the unknown 
Loch Ness type ‘monster’ lurking in the depths, a man sitting on his boat and a goose being 
sucked without trace – and all by the Olympic Park.” Jeory’s emphasis on the importance of 
the Olympics as a news-hook is not insignificant. 
 
Jeory’s position is supported by Alistair Kleebauer, the journalist at the Docklands and East 
London Advertiser who reported the story in November 2011. Kleebauer comments: “it offered 
something slightly different to harder news stories in an area where there’s a lot of interest 
because of the Olympics.”  
 
Patrick Sawer – who had reported the story in the Standard in 2005 – feels similarly: “I doubt 
if it would have made the Evening Standard without the Olympic connection.” Annie 
Chipchase – the first witness to observe such odd phenomena on the river – also notes that 
“given it was on the River Lea close to the Olympics, it provided a good story.”  
 
The Olympic connection was therefore crucial to the success of this story – as it has been to 
that of other, more serious, reports. When, for example, at the end of June 2012 a man was 
stabbed to death in a shopping mall adjacent to the London Olympics site, The Times, 
Telegraph, Guardian, Independent, Mail, Express, Mirror and Sun all referred to the Olympics 
in their respective headlines. The Guardian wrote of the “Olympic shopping centre stabbing 
victim”, The Daily Telegraph of the “Olympics site stab death”, the Mirror of the “games site 
stab killing” and The Sun of an “Olympic fight” and, the following day, of an “Olympic 
murder”. On 1 July 2012 The Sunday Express specifically used the event to propagate fears of 
security failures in the organization of the Olympics themselves (scheduled to begin later that 
month). It seems clear in this case that the news-hook was the Olympics: the story made it big 
specifically because of its tie-in to the Games, a connection emphasized by the exaggeration of 
the link (a shopping centre next to the Olympic site becomes the Olympic shopping centre; the 
murder an Olympic murder; and the mall’s security therefore a cause for concern over security 
at the Games themselves). 
 
The proliferation of the story of the River Lea beast in 2005 (just after the announcement of 
London’s successful bid to host the Olympics) and its resurrection in 2011 (the year before the 
Games, a story prompted by an anti-Olympics campaigner and even run on two occasions 
specifically by the Telegraph’s Olympics editor) appears based on a similar use of a news-
hook. In the fourteen versions of the story’s 2005 incarnation, the Olympic connection is 
mentioned in all but four stories. In 2011 the Olympics tie-in was deployed by every elaboration 
of the tale: by the BBC, The Sun, the Telegraph (twice), The Guardian (twice), the Express, 
the Mail and the Docklands and East London Advertiser.  
 
As in the case of the shopping mall killing, the coverage tends towards a blurring of the 
distinction between the site of the outrage and that of the Olympics themselves. The place 
where a goose has gone missing is not merely adjacent to the Olympic site: it soon transpires 
that a monster is lurking at the heart of the Games – “Olympic site has monster” (Express, 5 
August 2005), “a killer crocodile is prowling the site of London’s Olympic village” (Star, 5 
August 2005), a “killer water beast lurks at 2012 site” (Sun, 13 December 2012), “killer beast 
stalks Olympic Park” (Mail, 14 December 2012) – an “Olympic Park ‘crocodile’” (Telegraph, 
14 December 2012). 
 
There appear to be two reasons for this: the first is, obviously, an attempt to tie any story to a 
major event (to make the silly and seemingly insignificant suddenly newsworthy; to imbue an 
empty news product with apparent value); the second seems related to a desire to discover the 
potential for disaster in any major international event – budget concerns, security concerns, 
organizational concerns, construction concerns... crocodile concerns. Indeed, on 1 May 2012 
the Telegraph found yet another prospect of catastrophe when it warned that “poisonous 
caterpillars could bring misery to millions of Olympic spectators” – though this lepidopteral 
apocalypse not in the event materialize. 
 
6. METAPHORICITY: THE FERAL BEAST 
The crocodile is something of a Leviathan, but, if it in any sense recalls Hobbes’s analogy for 
the state as an “Artificiall Man” (Hobbes 1985: 81), it seems a particularly bestial incarnation 
of the body politic, one whose head is no longer in control of its appetites. As such it represents 
the primitive reptilian id without the societal moderation of the super ego; it is the dark 
unconscious which lies concealed beneath the visible surface of the iceberg in the famous 
psychoanalytic metaphor for the human mind.  
 If the beast of the River Lea represents a subliminal threat to the Olympics, then it may 
symbolize those two areas of British society – specifically those commonly perceived 
underclasses – whose very existence has been portrayed as threatening the smooth and safe 
running of the Games: the spectres, at once, of socially excluded, riotous youth and of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism. Both have clearly been identified as posing direct threats to the 
Olympics. Much of the coverage of the series of riots which had engulfed British inner city 
areas in early August 2011 had focused on the disruption to sporting events – from cancelled 
football matches in Tottenham to the future threat to the following year’s Olympic Games. 
Subsequent headlines, for example, had included ‘London riots: pressure grows to show that 
Olympics will be safe’ (Guardian, 9 August 2011), ‘Riots prompt Olympic security review’ 
(Telegraph, 9 August 2011), ‘Riots act as wake-up call for London’s torch bearers’ 
(Independent, 14 August 2011), ‘Scenes of rioting were damaging to image of the Games’ 
(Telegraph, 16 August 2011), ‘Rioters could target 2012 games’ (Independent, 9 September 
2011), ‘Gangs threat to Olympics’ (Mirror, 9 September 2011), ‘Summer riots could repeat 
during the Olympics’ (Independent, 29 November 2011), ‘Olympics must learn from the 
London riots’ (Express, 30 November 2011) and ‘Games will lead to gang looting spree’ (Star, 
23 April 2012). There is nothing spectacularly new in this: as far back as 15 September 1985 
The Sunday Times had, for instance, observed that a series of local riots had “tarnished 
Birmingham’s international image at a crucial stage in its campaign to host the 1992 Olympic 
Games.” Indeed on 2 October 1968 the BBC had reported that 25 people had been killed in 
riots in Mexico City – just ten days before that city had hosted the Olympics. 
 
The riots of 2012 had hit the London Borough of Hackney – the area of east London in which 
the Olympic Park was sited – particularly hard. On 6 August 2012, just over halfway through 
the London Games themselves, the Financial Times ran a story which argued that the legacy 
of the Games would be “slow to flourish in Hackney.” It pointed out that Hackney was the 
“sixth most deprived” borough in the country and that “under the Olympic gloss, many fear the 
underlying causes of the riots remain.” It concluded by quoting one local resident saying that 
“Hackney is the same old Hackney [...] Riots can happen at any time.” The same day London’s 
Mayor, Boris Johnson, told the BBC that, while he believed that the Olympics were “playing 
a role” in solving such issues, the previous year’s riots had exposed “deep social problems” 
which still needed to be addressed.  
 
The security of the Olympics appeared perennially under threat: from enemies at once alien 
and domestic. Terrorism was also, of course, repeatedly highlighted by the press as a threat to 
the Games. In the months before London 2012 British newspapers boasted such headlines as 
‘Terrorists linked with al-Qaeda are plotting a cyanide poison attack on London Olympics’ 
(Telegraph, 26 March 2012), ‘Al Qaeda plotting cynanide attack at Games’ (Sun, 26 March 
2012), ‘Games will be al-Qa’ida target’ (Independent on Sunday, 27 May 2012), ‘Olympic 
terrorism fears’ (Guardian, 6 June 2012) and ‘Olympic jet terror plot’ (Mirror, 2 July 2012). 
It goes almost without saying that the Olympics have represented an obvious enough target for 
terrorism since 1972’s Munich Games; indeed, according to The People as early as 27 August 
2000, Osama Bin Laden’s followers were planning a nuclear attack on the Games (on that 
occasion the Sydney Olympics). Such has been the ubiquity of these nightmarish speculations 
that in 2008 BBC television had broadcast a futuristic thriller series called Spooks: Code 9 set 
in the aftermath of a nuclear strike on the 2012 Games.  
 
The 2005 al-Qaeda attacks on London had taken place the day after the announcement that the 
city had won its Olympic bid, and those events continued to haunt the preparations for the 2012 
Games. The opening ceremony for those Games even featured a dance tribute to the victims of 
7 July 2005. During the Games (on 6 August 2012) Prime Minister David Cameron referred 
again to the events of summer 2005 when he spoke at a ceremony to commemorate the Munich 
massacre of 1972: “Our euphoria at winning the right to host these Olympics was brutally 
shattered within just 24 hours when terrorists targeted the London transport system and 52 
innocent men and women were murdered.”  
 
The crocodile may be seen as representing these threats of anarchy and of terrorism, those 
dangerous beasts which lurk concealed in the underbelly of the modern state. It is the enemy 
within – an illegitimate, exotic and inexplicable monster concealed at the heart of British 
society. It seems symbolic of the emergence of these violent and subversive underclasses, these 
threats so foreign to the superstructure. It is a terrorist threat to our national infrastructure – “a 
crocodile is feared to be terrorising the waterways of the 2012 Olympic Village site” (Express, 
5 August 2005) – one reputed even to consume those royal creatures, our Queen’s own swans. 
The coverage actively generated an atmosphere of terror or fear: the 23 stories which reported 
evidence of the creature in 2005 and 2011 contained one reference to terror, two to horror, one 
to shock, 15 to fear and even one (in the idiom of anti-terrorism strategy) to a “river monster 
alert.” On 14 December 2011 the Mail referred back to the events of six years earlier as the 
“2005 attack” – the “deadly attack” in question being that upon a goose in August 2005 rather 
than that upon the population of London a month earlier.  
 
7. PRETEXT: CROCODILE TEARS 
The unknown and exotic beast lurks just beneath the surface, at the centre of our metropolis, at 
the heart of our national infrastructure. The crocodilian threat has this much in common with 
the threat of a lawless and philistine socio-economic underclass and the al-Qaeda threat: it 
seems disconcertingly alien to the traditional expectations of Middle England. On 20 August 
2005 Derek Brown, for example, wrote in The Sun that “time was when you could go about 
your business in Britain knowing you would not be attacked... by a crocodile [...] Once a nettle 
rash or bee sting was as bad as it got in Blighty – but now it seems it’s a bit of a jungle out 
there. Even if the croc alert turns out to be a case of mistaken identity, it follows recent tales of 
sharks, giant jellyfish and monster mozzies haunting our shores.” Brown’s comments seem 
symbolically redolent of a fear of immigration and urban unrest that had been growing in 
visibility over the previous decade: a fear shared by all the good white folk of that nostalgic 
land of ‘Blighty’ (one has to ask: has anyone outside a 1940s film ever previously used that 
word?). On 14 December 2011 a spokesperson for British Waterways offered The Guardian 
an uncompromisingly draconian response to such alien threats as an urban crocodile in terms 
typical of this Little England xenophobia: “If a creature was found to be invasive, action will 
be taken.” The encroaching ‘jungle’ (as The Sun put it) is to be repelled by such jingoistic, 
Churchillian spunk. 
 
There seem to be three key assumptions taking place in these perspectives. The first is that the 
creature in question (if it exists at all) must be an illegal alien (a crocodile, an alligator, a turtle, 
a snake, a giant catfish or even an American mink); it is repeatedly emphasized that it is an 
exotic – rather than a more mundane and domestic – creature. (Even though, as Ted Jeory, the 
journalist who resurrected the story in 2011 has pointed out, “I don’t think anyone seriously 
believed it was a crocodile. I’m told the most likely explanation was probably a large pike.”)  
 
The second is that its presence in the river is most probably the result of the irresponsibility of 
a careless importer (the pet world’s equivalent of poor border control): as the Evening Standard 
noted on 4 August 2005, “although it is illegal to keep [...] crocodiles in Britain, some have 
made it into our waters before as unwanted pets. Red-eared terrapins and Chinese Mitten Crabs 
are in the river, after being released by owners who became tired of the exotic pets.”  
 
The third is that there is a reliable notion of the indigenous upon which these assumptions can 
be founded; it is as if (as Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party, suggested on the 
BBC’s Question Time in October 2009) one is indigenous only if one has been in the UK since 
the last Ice Age. Thus European minks and red squirrels and aboriginal cockneys and 
Cotswolders may be; while American minks and grey squirrels and Jews, blacks and Asians – 
and indeed Anglo-Saxons – are not. 
 
The combined impact of those three assumptions may be summarized thus: blame the 
immigrants, blame careless immigration policy, and deploy an arbitrary and self-serving 
definition to determine what constitutes an immigrant in the first place. An immigrant by such 
standards is anyone who threatens the socio-political establishment, a threat, that is, to the 
entrenched superstructure, to the pride of the nation (to the Olympic Games themselves). In 
that sense, be they terrorist or rioter, they are all part of the same reptilian underclass. Frantz 
Fanon (1990: 32) described the racist invention of an underclass in precisely such terms: 
“reptilian motions [...] breeding swarms […] spawn.”  
 
8. SUBTEXT: HERE BE DRAGONS 
On 9 March 2011, some six months prior to his much-reported crocodile sighting, Mike Wells 
had spoken to The Guardian about his fears that British Waterways would remove houseboats 
from the vicinity of the Olympic site: “This is social cleansing.” On 26 April 2012 Wells was 
arrested while making a film intending to document unsafe working practices at the Olympic 
construction site in Leyton Marsh, and as a result spent two days in police custody and a further 
six in prison before being granted bail. In a reflection upon his prison experience published 
online, Wells wrote of his growing sense therein of “the alienation of the subordinated classes.” 
 
Wells has added that the monster of the River Lea is “both real and a metaphor.” He has 
suggested that “the metaphor cuts into the dark heart of the Olympiad, like the Lea monster a 
huge and dangerous predator – it knows not right or wrong, it just feeds.” Thus the Games 
themselves come to assume what The Guardian on 27 July 2012 called “the popular image of 
elite Olympians as cold, emotionless machines with the warmth of hungry crocodiles, 
programmed to drag their prey down to the murky depths and keep them there.” 
 
In this context the mythical crocodile is an apt enough metaphor both for the hegemonic 
power’s fear of the threat of an emerging underclass or counterculture (the monster beneath the 
surface which threatens to overwhelm, to subvert, or by reflection to expose as monstrous, 
say, the public, national and nationalistic glory of the Olympic Games: the event which, in the 
words of the Telegraph on 6 August 2012, “put the Great back in Britain”) and for the all-
consuming immensity of the superstructure itself (as represented by the elite glamour and the 
commercial and political might of the Olympic Games). The monstrosity of the underclass is 
in these terms more than merely a justification for the superstructure’s draconian reaction to 
the stirrings of that underclass; it is precisely a projection of the superstructure’s own 
monstrosity, its own uncannily submerged, unconscious recognition of that monstrosity. The 
symbolic meaning of the alligator thus vacillates between power and protester, between 
legislator and agitator, in its subversive potential not only to show the underclass as a dark 
counterpart to the superstructure, but also to show the superstructure mirrored darkly in the 
eyes of the underclass. From houseboat residents, through environmentalist, anti-capitalist and 
anti-war campaigners, to rioters and terrorists: all are part of the imaginary crocodile, the 
mocking antithesis to the monolithic Leviathan. The crocodile is, then, at once the underclass 
and superstructure: the submerged monster is the superstructure’s own reflection in the glassy 
stream. 
 
Not far from this point on the river, more than a century ago, another boatman, Joseph Conrad’s 
Charles Marlow, recounted a similar tale of exotic monstrosity as he travelled up the Thames. 
In Heart of Darkness the humanity of the supposedly monstrous other returns to challenge the 
integrity of the hegemonic self. Joseph Conrad (1983: 69) wrote of the “monstrous” terrain of 
the Congo, a region whose inhabitants “were not inhuman, that was the worst of it – the 
suspicion of their not being inhuman.” The other is at once inhuman (because we’ve said it is) 
and human (because, despite all our protestations, it actually resembles us).  
 
The anxiety prompted by this moral ambiguity was addressed as early as the sixteenth century 
by Michel de Montaigne. In his essay ‘On the Cannibals’ Montaigne performs an uncanny 
deconstruction of the difference between the hegemonic self and its imagined other. For 
Montaigne (1991: 236-239) European notions of savagery and barbarism rebound upon 
Europe’s sense of cultural and moral identity: “we can indeed call those folk barbarians by the 
rules of reason but not in comparison with ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of 
barbarism […] It is no lie to say that these men are indeed savages – by our standards; for either 
they must be or we must be.” Reflecting upon Montaigne’s essay, Michel de Certeau (1986: 
73) has witnessed therein a series of radical shifts which deconstruct the notion of the barbarian: 
“an ambivalence (cannibals are barbarian because of their original naturalness; Occidentals are 
barbarian because of their cruelty); a comparison (our ways are more barbarian than theirs); 
and an alternative (one of us has to be barbarian, us or them, and it’s not them).”  
 
Edward Said (1985: 108) has argued that, in the colonial consciousness, the oppressed other is 
not “a true human being.” This monstrous other represents a dehumanized invention of the 
hegemonic self which eventually comes to seem more human than that which attempted to 
dehumanize it. Homi Bhabha (1984: 119-120) has thus suggested that this figure of monstrous 
otherliness reveals things “profoundly familiar” to that hegemonic self. Nietzsche (1973: 84) 
once famously warned that “he who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does 
not become a monster.” Or as Shakespeare’s Prospero put it in the fifth act of The Tempest, 
“this thing of darkness I acknowledge mine.”  
 
The 2012 Olympics’ opening ceremony was launched by the actor Kenneth Branagh proudly 
declaiming the monstrous Caliban’s famous speech from The Tempest’s the third act (“be not 
afeard; the isle is full of noises...”) whilst incongruously dressed as the Victorian industrial 
engineer Isambard Kingdom Brunel (almost as incongruous as Timothy Spall’s rendition of 
that same speech in the style and costume of Winston Churchill during the closing ceremony). 
On 15 June 2012 Simon Jenkins had written in The Guardian of the claim made by Danny 
Boyle (the director of the opening ceremony) that “the title of the show, Isles of Wonder [...] 
was ‘inspired by’ Shakespeare’s The Tempest, specifically Caliban’s speech.” Jenkins observed, 
however, that “Caliban, monster offspring of a witch, makes no mention of isles of wonder. 
Instead, he inhabits an island awash in conflict, drink, sex and dark arts [which] he is trying to 
return [...] to primeval anarchy.”  
 
On 28 January 2012 The Daily Telegraph had noted that Boyle’s opening ceremony would be 
inspired by the vision of The Tempest’s “cursed monster”. The same day the Daily Mail had 
curiously observed that “the half-man, half-monster Caliban is devoted to the island on which 
he lives – and Mr Boyle hopes to mirror that pride and patriotism in the ceremony.” (Caliban 
may love his island – but he is hardly patriotically loyal to its political regime – it is, after all, 
his explicit ambition to seize it back from Prospero’s colonial hegemony.) Taking rather fewer 
nationalistic liberties in its interpretation of Shakespeare’s play, The Independent had that day 
pointed out that “lines delivered to two drunken butlers by a freckled monster with a penchant 
for non-consensual sex [...] are the inspiration behind director Danny Boyle’s vision for the 
London 2012 Olympics’ opening ceremony” – and had gone on to note that “Caliban has come 
to represent the rebellion of colonised peoples against their paternalistic overlords.” Thus might 
early seventeenth century Stratford-upon-Avon come to address Stratford 2012. 
 
The mythic crocodile of the River Lea seems not entirely unlike Shakespeare’s Caliban, a 
monster of the people, the creature which shows the hegemonic fantasy what it really is. In his 
Guardian article of 15 June Simon Jenkins had imagined that Boyle’s opening ceremony might 
feature a “monster [rising] from its bed” to confront the crowd with the truth about themselves. 
But when Boyle’s theatricals kicked off the Games on Friday 27 July 2012, this did not take 
place (save for a rather dismal giant puppet of J.K. Rowling’s Voldemort); nor did a derisive 
crocodile rise revenant and Godzilla-like from the depths of its aquatic slumbers to reclaim the 
East End in the name of its proletarian heritage and to face the global audience with the truth 
of their own servitude and hypocrisy. Nor indeed did either riot or terror disrupt the grandeur 
of the Games. Although the show was apparently sufficiently radical to make one right-wing 
MP tweet that it was the “most leftie” such ceremony he had ever seen, there was scant 
suggestion of an anti-establishment uprising. Peter Pan was there, but sadly no crocodile. 
 
The opening ceremony had begun with a filmed insert which tracked the history of England’s 
green and pleasant land through the progress of the Thames. Yet how much more murky and 
monstrous might a similar voyage down the course of the River Lea have been – crocodile-
dark and Leviathan-Satanic – the source text of an almost irretrievably riven nation? 
 
The figure of Leviathan recurs in the Bible as a symbol for Satan; but here, in these tall tabloid 
tales of urban monsters, it sometimes seems closer to demos than to demon. It represents the 
alien, the excluded and the repressed; those who will not serve the superstructure. These stories 
afford a symbolic space for excluded voices – a strangely democratic space, a fantastical, 
populist, satirical and heteroglossic space – a space for the voices from the margins and from 
the marshes, from those interstitial places of exclusion and exile. This space might therefore 
seem at once liminal, subliminal and sublime: a transcendentally subversive mode of political 
communication – a mode which might be derided by intellectual columnists in the quality press, 
but one which (precisely because it is not taken seriously) allows symbolic expression to 
positions which tend to be denigrated and excluded from public discourse. This creature, then, 
is less Hobbes’s Leviathan than Rabelais’s Gargantua; it is the irrepressible, bestial, 
unregulated carnivalesque (the threat of urban violence, and of terrorism for that matter) which 
lurks beneath the shiny public surface of the official national festival. In February 2005 
environmental campaigner Annie Chipchase – who a few months later would be the first person 
to report the Lea’s reptilian menace – had told the BBC that she objected to the London 
Olympic bid because decisions as to the proposed staging of the Games “had not been reached 
democratically.” From this perspective we might be tempted to see this mythic crocodile as a 
symbol of the resurgence of the democratic will against an autocratic system.  
 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1984: 90) wrote of the “demonic and unbridled atmosphere” of the mediaeval 
carnival – and yet noted that even here the licence was merely provisional, that the revelry 
could not be permitted to become revolutionary. As Horne and Whannel (2012: 150-151) 
suppose, “carnival might imply a degree of temporary licence allowed by authority, but often 
carries the sense of danger or excitement that such authority might be overturned, disobeyed 
or defied.” They however suppose that, save for a bit of face-painting and the odd Mexican 
wave, it is rare to see such aspects of the carnivalesque displayed by major sporting events 
(Horne and Whannel 2012: 151). Though Danny Boyle had included “mosh pits” (anarchic 
crowd spaces) in his design for the Olympics’ opening ceremony, the disorder was contained 
therein under strict licence and within strict limits. 
 
That which threatens hegemonic power is not the licensed festival but the possibility that the 
underclass might transgress the barriers of the licensing authority to assume their own power 
to license themselves. Such a mode of popular authority appears so alien to the superstructure 
that it is often portrayed as a breed of anarchy, a bestial, atavistic alternative to civilization, 
civilization’s nemesis. But might it not also be seen as adhering to the essence of democracy; 
and might therefore these silly populist news stories unfold a symbolic resonance that affords 
a shift from the demagogic towards the possibility of the democratic?  
 
9. CONCLUSION: THE RISE OF THE DEMOCROC 
In 2005 the sight of a submerging goose in a tributary of the Thames sparked a panic about a 
metropolitan crocodile in the nation’s press. Exactly the same thing recurred in 2011. The story 
seemed so newsworthy not only because of its setting – the site of the future Olympic Park – 
but also because it offered symbolic echoes of concerns which appeared to threaten the glories 
of the Games: Islamist terrorism (a threat brought home in 2005 by the al-Qaeda attacks on 
London) and a turbulent underclass (an issue underlined in 2011 by inner city riots). The exotic 
threat of the crocodile seemed then to symbolize the factor so often held accountable in the 
pages of the populist press for both of these phenomena: immigration. Yet, if the crocodile 
appeared to represent the monstrous forces of chaos which underlay and threatened to 
overwhelm the monolithic state, it also simultaneously signalled the brutality and voracity of 
the structures which underpinned that state. Indeed the ambiguous undercurrent to this 
symbolism mirrored something similarly subversive witnessed in the subtext to aspects of the 
opening ceremony of the 2012 Games themselves. 
 
The crocodile is clearly a monster, but it remains unclear what kind of monster it is. It is this 
fertile ambiguity which exposes those contradictions inherent to the power structure which the 
crocodile’s ambit represents. An immediate reading might suggest that the crocodile exposes 
the sensationalism (the desire for spectacular fantasy) in the popular press – and therefore in 
the popular press’s perception of its mass readership. A further interrogation of the crocodile 
might come to suggest that it represents the dreaded rise of an imagined underclass – a class of 
terrorists, immigrants and rioters, of all that threatens to engulf the precious sensibilities of 
Middle England. Another level of interpretation might suggest that, on the contrary, the 
crocodile represents not the imagined monstrosity projected upon the disempowered by those 
in power but in fact the actual monstrosity of those in power who would seek to project their 
monstrosity onto the powerless. Yet another reading might suppose that the feral pack are not 
the underclass but (as Tony Blair asserted in June 2007) the press themselves. We might 
therefore eventually come to see the fable of the crocodile as representing the extent of the 
power relations between all of these groups – the news producers and the news consumers, the 
underclass and the elite.  
 
Temple (2010) has suggested that the populist press merely reflect the inequities of society. 
But this example appears to suggest that the carnivalesque sensationalism of such publications 
could articulate a symbolic language through which their audiences might begin to reconsider 
the power relations within their society. These relations are not only reflected and reinforced 
(as Temple would suppose) but also exposed and potentially subverted by such discourse. This 
populism might therefore be seen to sponsor a mode of popular discourse essential for 
democracy. This tale of a crocodile, then, not only offered a symbolic satire upon demagogic 
hysteria about terror and anarchy, but also illuminated real debates about the mandate and 
impact of the 2012 Games. 
 
The monster of the River Lea turns its sense of monstrosity back upon the structures of power 
which projected it. Michel Foucault (1998: 101) proposed that “discourse transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but it also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and 
makes it possible to thwart it.” These fantastical narratives then, by exposing the absurdity of 
these power relations through a symbolic mode of discourse which circumvents (because it 
goes largely unnoticed by) the censorship of the superstructural super ego, might, somewhat 
incongruously, constitute – to steal a phrase from Eagleton (1976: 76) – “part of our liberation 
from oppression.” Reader, reporter and witness collaborate in the comedic and curious myth 
of the aquatic beast – in a carnivalesque discourse which darkly (obscurely and subversively) 
mirrors the formal festivities above the waterline – a discourse through which, as Bakhtin 
imagined, audience and performer (and underclass and superstructure) become 
indistinguishable in the guts of this monstrous metaphor.  
 
Anslow (2008: 58) has pointed out that “Jungians would claim that consumers of news reports 
respond to the same collectively unconscious contents as the journalists who gather, edit and 
present the stories. Thus, unconsciously, they expect shared, archetypal, embedded patterns to 
assert themselves in the reportage.” In these terms, the river monster seems to approximate the 
liminal figure of the trickster in Jung’s archetypal taxonomy: Jung writes (1991: 262) that this 
ancient and yet still symbolically fertile figure “seems like an old river-bed in which the water 
still flows.” This figure, for Jung at once saturnalian and atavistic, thus reveals to us a “world 
of primordial darkness [...] even on the highest plane of civilization” (Jung 1991: 266). This 
embodiment of carnival, “half animal, half divine” (Jung 1991: 255), exposes the primeval 
sediment upon which civilization has founded what Prospero would call its insubstantial 
pageant. As this funny little myth’s audience and story-tellers conspire to prick the pretensions 
of the grand narrative and ritual of the nation’s Games, they may thus assume the age-old role 
of the trickster, whether Mr Punch or indeed the crocodile – the shadowy figure demanding 
answers to its impossible, paradoxical riddles, to what Jung (1991: 271) nicely calls its quaestio 
crocodilina.  
 
These echoes seem irrepressible. The beast haunts us still. It just won’t go away. Our revels 
now, as Prospero announced, are ended. But: no, proclaims Caliban – they have only just begun. 
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